

THE Greater New York REASONS WHY.

By EDWARD C. GRAVES.

SHOWING why Brooklyn rent-payers, mechanics and working people should favor the consolidation of New York and Brooklyn into one city. Also showing the great benefit to New York from such consolidation. SEQUEL to the consolidation pamphlet "How Taxes in Brooklyn can be reduced one-half."

CONSOLIDATION PAMPHLET No. 2.

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To be had at Headquarters CONSOLIDATION LEAGUE, Room 314, No. 189 Montague Street, Brooklyn; Headquarters CONSOLIDATION COMMISSION, 214 Broadway, New York, and at the BROOKLYN REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE.

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BOX 57

COMMISSION
OF
MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION INQUIRY.

CHAPTER 311, LAWS OF 1890

COMMISSIONERS.

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ANDREW H. GREEN, President.
J. S. T. STRANAHAN, Vice-President.
ALBERT E. HENSCHER, Secretary.

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Consolidation Commission :

In response to your request for a continuation of the argument before you, which led to the publication of the consolidation pamphlet "An Appeal to Reason;" or, "How taxes in Brooklyn can be reduced one-half," I will start at the point where that pamphlet leaves off, viz., the reduction of Brooklyn taxes one-half by the consolidation of the cities.

While it is true that the bill (Chapter 64, laws 1894) submitting the matter to a popular vote does not contain a clause providing that the taxes of New York and Brooklyn shall be equalized as a condition of the consolidation, yet we all know that New York has never yet annexed any territory without equalizing the taxes of the annexed territory with its own. This was the case with the annexation to New York of the Towns of Morrisania, West Farms, and Kingsbridge, in 1874. In each of which cases a popular vote was first taken under a special act (Chapter 613, laws 1873), which vote resulting in a majority in favor of annexation, was followed the next year by an act of the Legislature absolutely and permanently annexing to New York the towns voting in its favor. See Chapter 329, laws of 1874.

Precisely in the same pathway Brooklyn and Long Island City are now proceeding, viz.: First, the passage of a law providing for the ascertaining of public sentiment by taking a vote "For" and "Against" consolidation in the localities affected by it, so that it may be known which side has the most supporters, to the end that being known and officially declared, the fundamental principle of the American Government, "the majority shall rule," may then be followed. The law has been passed, the die cast, and in November, 1894, the vote will be taken, upon the result of which the future of New York and Brooklyn so largely depends. If such vote shows a majority in its favor, then in the winter of 1895 such further legislation will be had as will carry out the wishes of the majority and cause the careful preparation of a proper charter to govern the consolidated city.

The first question that arises to the mind of the Brooklyn taxpayer then is: if he votes for it, will his taxes in case of such consolidation certainly be lowered to the level of New York taxes without a clause to that effect being in the bill submitting the matter to a vote?

To which I unquestionably answer, Yes. When the cities come to be actually united all necessary laws providing for but one and a uniform rate of taxation in the consolidated city will certainly be

enacted. Any other kind of consolidation would be a crime towards Brooklyn. Again, with the precedents of the three towns above quoted, having been taken into New York, and their taxes not only equalized with New York, but the towns presented with a part ownership of the Brooklyn ferry and water front franchises, it is not to be supposed for one moment that Brooklyn itself will not be equally as well treated.

You may therefore take it for granted that when New York and Brooklyn are merged into one city it will be upon a basis of equal taxation, equal rights to all. Any other kind of consolidation would not stand one year before it would be repealed and made equal, or the political party opposing it be wiped out of power by the voters in Brooklyn. Assuming, as I understand to be the case, that you are now convinced of two things: first, by the facts and figures set forth in the other pamphlet spoken of, that equalizing the New York and Brooklyn tax rates and tax valuations will reduce Brooklyn taxes about 50 per cent. without perceptibly increasing New York taxes; and secondly, that such equalization will certainly be had and fully provided for as a part of the legislation necessary to carry out and effect a union of the cities; I will in this pamphlet start at that point and endeavor to show you how the rent-payer, the working man, the working woman, the mechanic, the laborer, of both cities will be benefited; and in particular how New York will gain advantage.

Before picking up the threads of argument and weaving them into one harmonious whole, let us give a hasty glance backward and view the rise and progress of the consolidation movement from its start down to the present day. So that we may know where we stand and why it is that these two great cities now about to be joined have not before been made one. The East River is almost as wide to-day as it ever was. The residents of Brooklyn are no more dependent on New York now than they have been at any time for ages past. Indeed, in many respects they are not nearly as much so as in former years; yet we all admit that these two great cities are now on the eve of becoming one, and that for the first time in the long and tortuous history of the consolidation movement, success is within its grasp and its object about to be accomplished.

II.

HISTORY OF THE CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENT.

No man can say who first suggested consolidation of the cities. It is not a new idea, but one very old, having been discussed more

than one hundred years ago. In fact, the idea suggests itself from the close proximity of the two cities. As late as the years 1830 to 1834 Brooklyn was refused a city charter by the Legislature of the State of New York, because the Legislature said that the annexation of Brooklyn to New York was a case of manifest destiny, bound to occur so very soon, that there was no object in giving Brooklyn a city charter, as it would simply be a waste of time. That was sixty years ago and Brooklyn has not been annexed yet. Let me quote from history.

Stiles History of Kings County on page 145, says:

"1834, January, the Brooklyn people, undaunted by their previous defeats and confident in their own resources and the justice of their claims, again renewed their application to the Legislature for a city charter. The city of New York still threw the whole weight of her wealth and influence against the movement, objecting that the limits of the city of New York ought to include the whole of Kings County and Richmond County; that the period was not far distant, when a population of not less than 2,000,000 would be contained within New York, Kings and Richmond Counties; that all commercial cities are natural rivals and competitors, and that contentions, inconvenience and other calamities grow out of such rivalries; that a previous act of the Legislature passed in 1821, incorporating the village of Brooklyn, was an encroachment on the rights of New York."

A hard struggle then took place in the Legislature, the New York City members clamoring that Brooklyn should be annexed to New York and not made a separate city, fought the charter and did their best to defeat it. Public feeling ran high, meetings were held, speeches made, and excitement grew to fever heat. New York to a man willing to annex Brooklyn, but vehemently opposed to a separate charter for it, and Brooklyn, taking exactly the opposite position, viz., to a man in favor of its separate city charter and vehemently opposed to annexation.

At length, with the aid of up country Senators and Assemblymen Brooklyn triumphed, and on April 8, 1834, after a Legislative battle of three months and an actual fight of over three years, Brooklyn secured the coveted city charter; and that was the last that was heard of annexation to New York for over twenty years.

In 1856, Cyrus P. Smith, then State Senator from Kings County, introduced a resolution in the State Senate looking towards the consolidation of New York and Brooklyn; the New York newspapers spoke well of it; but Brooklyn, as usual, showed itself vehemently opposed, and after a little discussion the resolution was defeated and the matter dropped.

On April 23d, 1857, while Fernando Wood was Mayor of New York, the "Metropolitan Police Act" went into effect, whereby New York and Brooklyn police with those of surrounding Country towns were by law merged into one, placed under a single control and called the "Metropolitan Police Department." It was afterwards followed by similar "Acts," merging into one the fire and health departments of the cities. The hopes of consolidationists then ran high, for it was believed that these "Acts" would effect speedy annexation of the cities themselves. But, alas, for human hopes, they did not have such effect; and on April 5th, 1870, after a fitful existence of thirteen years, the "Metropolitan Police Act" with its co-acts were repealed, and Brooklyn given control of its own departments. And with it all visions of consolidation of the cities again faded into thin air.

About the year 1872, Mr. John Winslow of Brooklyn secured the names of several thousand people, residents of New York and Brooklyn, to a petition, asking that the matter of annexing Brooklyn to New York be submitted to a popular vote and presented the same to the Legislature; the newspapers casually mentioned it, showing that the drift of public opinion in New York was favorable, but that in Brooklyn was opposed; a bill was introduced in the Senate and after discussion was defeated by the Brooklyn members and the matter again passed out of sight. Occasionally since then some New York newspaper has contained a vigorous editorial or a column of interviews with leading citizens favoring consolidation of the cities, only to be followed by some equally vigorous editorial in a Brooklyn newspaper and another column of interviews opposing it. Other newspapers would then comment in a listless manner on Brooklyn's stubbornness, and the breeze which sprang up would die out. Various spasmodic attempts have been made by different people to merge the two cities into one, but all without avail, for while New York was in favor of it, Brooklyn continued to be vehemently opposed.

For over thirty years, Andrew H. Green of New York, and James S. T. Stranahan of Brooklyn, have battled bravely for consolidation of the cities, at times standing almost alone in the movement, suffering defeat upon defeat, yet they have never faltered or flinched in the performance of their great work. After repeated attempts by Mr. Stranahan and Mr. Green, the Legislature in 1890 passed a bill authorizing the formation of this commission to inquire into the expediency of consolidating the various municipalities located around the Bay of New York,

and report their opinion to the Legislature. Several such reports have been made from time to time, but until 1894 none of them were adopted or favorably acted upon by the Legislature.

In 1891, the Brooklyn tax question, a problem hitherto unsolved, began to receive attention as a consolidation measure, and was forced to the front by those who believed it to be the key of the situation. From that time public sentiment in Brooklyn began to grow. In 1893, a consolidation league was formed in Brooklyn by those converted to the support of the movement through the new treatment of the Brooklyn tax question. A public meeting was held and a committee of two hundred Brooklyn citizens appointed, who chartered a special train, and on March 8th, 1893, journeyed to Albany, made speeches before the Legislature and asked that the matter be submitted to a popular vote. A bill to that effect was introduced but, through the vehement opposition of the Brooklyn representatives in the Legislature, failed to become a law. The consolidation league undismayed kept up their good fight, distributed their literature, confined to the single point of the reduction of Brooklyn taxes; 30,000 copies of the pamphlet spoken of were distributed, and public sentiment in Brooklyn grew in favor of consolidation with amazing rapidity. State senators and members of Assembly favorable to the movement were elected, and in 1894 a bill submitting the matter to a popular vote was passed by both houses of the Legislature with scarcely a dissenting vote. So great was the change in public sentiment on this point.

During all previous years, while New York had been passively in favor of consolidation of the cities, Brooklyn had been vehemently opposed to it. Brooklyn people said they could see where New York would be benefited by its aggrandizement from the absorption of Brooklyn, the addition to its population, to its many miles of streets, etc.; but they could not see where Brooklyn would gain anything in return for being wiped out of existence. Any man having a fortune of a million is always ready to add another million to it. And what is true of a single individual is true of a city. Any city of a million or two million of inhabitants is always ready to increase its fortunes by the addition of another million. It is human nature the world over. But it is also human nature for the *other fellow* to be unwilling to give up his million, or any part of it, to oblige his more wealthy neighbor, or the other city to surrender its charter at the request of a competitor.

What practical benefit will consolidation be to Brooklyn? or to use a commonplace expression: What is Brooklyn "going to get out of it?" is a question that until within the last three years has never been successfully answered. Whenever the subject has been agitated, like Banquo's ghost, up came that question: "What benefit will it be to Brooklyn?" Never an answer. For over one hundred years that question has been repeated, and for over one hundred years deep silence has been the only reply. Therefore, Brooklyn opposed consolidation or annexation, as it was then called, and continued to oppose it, as by right it should, if no benefit would result. It is no light thing this, asking a great city to surrender its charter and voluntarily go out of existence. For hundreds of years charter rights have been zealously guarded, great wars have been carried on and thousands of people slain defending charter rights. Our own "Charter Oak" of Hartford, was a tree made famous the world over, because a handful of English colonists in Connecticut risked their lives and hid their charter in the old oak tree, rather than surrender it or allow one single line of its provisions to be cancelled; yet we, a city of one million people, numbering more souls than one-third the total white population of America at the time the charter oak, within its shaggy bark, preserved for Connecticut those sacred rights, are asked peaceably to surrender our charter rights and without protest give up our charter, go out of existence forever, and wipe the name of Brooklyn off the face of the earth, as one would wipe it from a slate with a damp sponge, merging it into and making it part of the "Greater New York." And while I am most earnestly in favor of such course, believing it to be Brooklyn's only salvation from impending bankruptcy and financial ruin, yet it is not a matter to be lightly considered or hastily done. That question, that eternal question: "What practical benefit will it be to Brooklyn," having now for the first time been successfully answered by the demonstration that it will reduce taxes about one-half on every foot of real estate in Brooklyn, whether owned by man, woman or child, it remains to be shown what benefits other than the dollars and cents thus saved to the Brooklyn tax-payer will accrue from consolidation of the cities, and who it is that will receive those benefits? To ascertain this we must take up the Brooklyn and New York sides of the question separately, and treat them from different standpoints, each side having its own separate benefits; which, however, when the cities are consolidated will redound to the benefit of all concerned.

III.

BROOKLYN BENEFITS.

And first as to Brooklyn: So far as Brooklynites are concerned, we must take that most perplexing problem, the Brooklyn tax question, and its successful solution by consolidation of the cities as our starting point or fountain-head from which the other benefits flow. All the evils of which Brooklyn complains, either spring from and grow out of its excessive taxation or they are remediable without consolidation. Dishonest city government can be remedied by simply voting "the rascals out" to whatever party they may belong. But the terrible incubus, the crushing weight that Brooklyn labors under of an excessive and constantly increasing rate of taxation, notwithstanding honest administration of city affairs, can only be remedied by consolidation of the cities. Like all other political changes the consolidation movement is one of slow growth in Brooklyn. It is no easy task to convert a million people.

Brooklyn is to-day one of the most excessively taxed cities in the United States. Its average taxes for year 1893-1894 are $\$2.85\frac{1}{10}$ per \$100 of property, on a tax valuation of from 70 to 100 per cent. of the actual value of the property; while New York tax-rate is but \$1.82 per \$100, on a tax valuation averaging less than 50 per cent. of the actual value of the property taxed. The State Board of Tax Assessors, after a most searching examination on this point, certify under oath that the average assessed valuation of property for taxes in New York County is only $44\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of its actual value, and that in Brooklyn it is 70 per cent. of its actual value (see page 22 of the pamphlet before referred to). Since the State Board made their report on this point in 1890, Brooklyn taxes have been increased three times successively; to wit, in the years 1891, 1892, 1893, and New York taxes have been correspondingly reduced three successive times in the same years, so that the difference in the taxation of the two cities is now twelve per cent. greater than it was when the State Board made their report in 1890.

Why this situation is bound to exist even with honest administration of city affairs in both cities, I have endeavored to point out in the pages of the other pamphlet.

Without going over the same ground it is sufficient to say that the geographical situation of the two cities and the widely different nature of taxable property situated in them, caused by that geographical

situation, is such, that it gives New York the business property, great corporations, and water front franchises properly belonging to both cities; therefore, the great difference in the tax rates is bound to exist and will continue to exist until the two cities are merged into one. And the longer they remain separate the worse the present state of affairs will be.

IV.

THE RENT-PAYER BENEFITED.

Having settled in our minds that the Brooklyn tax-payers will be benefited by consolidation of the cities, the next question is, who are the tax-payers?

The rent-payer is the tax-payer, not the real estate owner. The owner adds his taxes on to his rents, divides it among his tenants, collects it back from them; so that the rent-payer and not the landlord is the actual tax-payer.

Extortionately high taxes on real estate give a place a bad name. Nobody will lend money or do business in a town loaded to death with taxes if he can help it. Brooklyn has to pay one-half to one per cent. higher interest on its bonds than New York, simply on that account. The men who suffer most by it are comparatively one real estate owner, one real estate agent, a thousand brick-layers, carpenters, plumbers, masons, painters, paper-hangers, and others engaged in the building trades, who with quarry-men, the stoneyard men, brick-maker, lumber-yard keeper, and others engaged in manufacturing building materials, the teamster who hauls them, and the butcher, baker, candle-stick maker and other store-keepers who sell goods to them and receive pay out of the money earned by them in the building trades, with the families of all of them, compose the entire city of Brooklyn. So then when you say that nothing but real estate interests and its dependencies in Brooklyn will be benefited by consolidation, you state the truth. But that's all there is, you have got the whole, how can you have any more? To say that nobody in Brooklyn except those thus directly or indirectly interested in real estate matters will be benefited by consolidation of the cities, is equivalent to saying that nobody except every man, woman and child in Brooklyn will be benefited by it.

Who then oppose it? Only certain office holders and city contractors engaged in getting rich out of the public crib, and who fear that consolidation of the cities will cause the loss of their jobs, oppose

it! And even these, with honest administration, do not need to fear it; there must of a necessity be just as many policemen, firemen, and other placemen then as now, and they would be paid the same salaries as the New York policemen, firemen, school teachers, and other place holders of the same class; and be furthermore placed beyond danger of loss of their places or loss of their chance of promotion by accidental loss of political pull.

High taxation of real estate affects the poor even more than it does the rich. It reaches further than any other one thing on this earth and radiates in a thousand different directions, each direction working a separate injury, the land or building taxed being only the smallest part of it. Let us see: Excessive taxation prevents building, because no person will buy a building which, when completed, will be loaded down with taxes so heavy as to make it an unprofitable building. Therefore the mason, bricklayer, carpenter, plumber, painter, tin-roofer, and others engaged in the building trades must go unemployed. And earning no money they cannot pay their butcher, baker or grocer; he not getting his dues in time fails or is driven out of business. So also with all others whose occupations depend on building, such as the lumber-yard keeper, stoneyard men, lime and plaster mill men, day laborers, teamsters, &c. These all being in hard lines purchase no goods of the big merchant, who, in his turn feeling the lines tighten and knowing of his own increased taxes, reduces his expenses, discharges clerks and cuts down salaries, thus producing more distress. The poor tired clerk and shop-girl, through no fault of theirs, then go home discharged or with but half salary, there to disappoint the loved ones depending on them. Like the unemployed mason and carpenter across the hall they have no money for the landlord, dispossession for non-payment of rent stares them in the face, they become sick at heart and so thoroughly discouraged that the very stones in the streets appear their enemies and gay colored pictures on dead walls they pass seem to mock them. The biting wind whistles and howls around their little attic home as it surely never did before. It tells the wife that she is a tax-payer, because her husband being out of work on account of such high taxes on real estate that it renders his trade unprofitable; she must therefore go without the comfortable sacque promised her for this winter as her contribution to the tax on real estate. It tells the child that it also is a tax-payer; because, for the same reason, it can have no toys for Christmas. It tells them all of grim gaunt hunger and want in

store, and some times whispers that the only escape from payment of those taxes is the river—the black and silent river.

Why! The babe in the cradle, who for such reason must go without its Sunday frock, is one of the real tax-payers of Brooklyn. Not the landlord who drives by in his carriage, collecting his taxes back in his rents or dispossessing the tenants for non-payment of them. His wife and child are not troubled with taxes; his child will never be deprived of its Christmas toys, nor his wife go without her sealskin wraps and diamond earrings on account of the taxes on this flat building or that tenement house. Oh, no! It is the rent-payer in those buildings, not the landlord, who pays the taxes,—oftentimes by skimping and pinching the rent-payer's family to do it. Few, and you may say none of those rent-paying people know that high taxation, not only of the house they live in but of other houses and other lands in the same city with which they have nothing to do, and probably never saw, is the real cause of their distress.

Such is the history of excessive taxation, not in Brooklyn alone, but in every city and in all countries on the face of the earth.

Every kind of business and property except real estate has its own separate vicissitudes, which do not affect or concern to any great extent other kinds of property or other trades or lines of business. Not so with real estate, on which we are all dependent in one way or another for a home and a roof to shelter us. Its excessive taxation paralyzes *all* industries doing business in the community so taxed, and affects most those who, like the babe in the cradle, are most helpless against it and least able to stand it.

That man is a fool who says that because he does not own the real estate he rents that he does not therefore in one way or another pay the taxes on it and is not concerned in the reduction of its taxes one-half by consolidation of the cities. What effect the reduction of Brooklyn taxes fifty per cent. by consolidation, in addition to the reduction obtained by honest administration of city affairs will be, you can judge as well as I. Suffice it to say that exactly the opposite picture will be presented, buildings by the hundreds of every kind will be seen going up, thousands and tens of thousands of mechanics will be employed at good wages, in turn patronizing those around them, shopkeepers again busy; the wife, the child, and the babe, having paid their taxes, are again happy. And this prosperity, mark you! will not be a temporary boom like a world's fair; but permanent, necessarily

permanent, because the inducing cause of that prosperity, the consolidation of the cities, will be permanent. The persons who will, therefore, receive the greatest and most immediate benefit from consolidation of the cities and its consequent fifty per cent. reduction of Brooklyn taxes are THE WORKING MEN AND WORKING WOMEN, THE MECHANICS, LABORERS, AND RENT-PAYERS OF BOTH CITIES, *and to them, far more than to the land owner, the consolidation of the cities will be a veritable Godsend.*

It is possible that rents in certain localities near the Brooklyn Bridge may go up somewhat. But with the certainty that new and better accommodations, for even less rents, can then be had by riding ten minutes further out on the elevated roads, where now are vacant lots; and that thousands upon thousands of mechanics will be thereby given steady employment. Who, under such circumstances, would not be glad to have these rents near the bridge go up? even if they doubled in price, a thing utterly impossible.

V.

PER CAPITA COST OF THE CITIES.

The fact that the per capita cost of the Brooklyn city government may be less than the per capita cost of the New York city government, and the cost of running the Brooklyn fire and police departments less per head of Brooklyn population than the cost of New York fire and police departments is per head of New York population, which the opponents of consolidation so dearly love to use as arguments against it, have really nothing to do with the case. There is no such thing as a per capita tax to support either city government; therefore, the per capita cost of running that city government is not relevant, or at least only remotely so.

Let us, however, for argument's sake suppose a case. Suppose that half of the population of New York city should some fine day suddenly take it into their heads to move over to Brooklyn. The per capita cost of governing the remaining population of New York would immediately be doubled in consequence, and the per capita cost of governing Brooklyn would immediately become less than half what it now is; but the taxes in Brooklyn would jump up amazingly, because while the people (per capita) had moved to Brooklyn, the taxable property remained in New York.

Suppose further, for argument's sake, that the other half of New York's population should then take it into their heads to also move over to Brooklyn, leaving nobody as residents behind them but the watchmen, janitors and keepers employed to look after the property, the per capita cost of governing New York would then be towards ten thousand dollars per head of its population, but for the very same reason New York taxes would be almost nothing, while Brooklyn per capita cost would be almost nothing, but its taxes would be frightful. In fact, it would not be taxation, but confiscation. Brooklyn would have the people but not the property, and New York the property but not the people. New York and Brooklyn taxes and per capita cost are then in the two opposite scales of a pair of balances—as one goes up the other comes down. If per capita cost is low, taxes are high and vice versa. You may say that I have drawn an extreme picture. Not so, for except the tenement houses east of the Bowery, there are very few residents now in New York below 4th Street, but the janitors, watchmen and keepers of the property and taxable wealth stored there. These people are moving away, crowded out by business, and as they move to Brooklyn its taxes go up and per capita cost comes down.

The per capita argument then so far as it is relevant, instead of being an argument against consolidation, when closely examined is an argument in favor of it. Nothing is more certain than that Brooklyn taxes mount higher and higher each year and New York taxes as steadily grow lower. And, further, that this state of affairs is bound to continue so long as the two cities remain separate, notwithstanding honest government of both cities, for the reasons given in the other pamphlet which will not be repeated here.

VI.

BENEFIT TO NEW YORK.

That New York will be greatly benefited from annexation of Brooklyn, by reason of New York's aggrandizement being placed in one instant in the proud position of second city in size in the world, is conceded. The consolidated city will at once have a population 500,000 greater than Paris, and be three-quarters as large as London; for we will have, by the act of consolidation, a population exceeding 3,000,000, and that, too, without the annexation of far distant suburbs, a process that we ridicule in western cities, but by the simple process of welding New York, Kings County and Long Island City into one

city, even if no other territory should be included. And, furthermore, create a city so large that no Ring or Hall can possibly control it. Therefore, the natural tendencies of the consolidated city will be towards good government.

Now comes a new feature in the consolidation movement, a feature never before contemplated, because until recently it did not exist; but which now exists and is destined to play an important part in the consolidation movement, viz., the wonderfully rapid growth of Chicago, the danger of its shortly passing New York and becoming the first city in the land, compelling New York to play second to Chicago forever after in everything, no matter what—business, music, society, politics, the drama, everything. Much against the New Yorker's will, he is obliged to admit that Chicago is growing very much faster than New York, and in fact it is destined to overtake New York in from three to five years. But it is not growing so fast as New York and Brooklyn together. This young city on the shores of Lake Michigan, like a great overgrown boy, as big at the age of 16 as his father, and still growing, you may sneer at all you like, but it is there every time, and with a capacity for getting there wholly unknown here in the east. A hard working youngster who is never idle, who perhaps lacks finish and polish, but who does not lack public spirit and vehement energy in everything it undertakes, in which spirit New York is sadly lacking. Covered with soot and dirt, ragged and very, very "sassy," its wonderful growth is not only a standing menace to New York's pride and prosperity as the metropolis of America, but its growth upon growth has caused the Chicago menace to become an imminent danger so near, so great as to be startling. A danger not distant, not far off in years, but here now at hand. Just as certain as that New York is on Manhattan Island, just so certain will Chicago pass New York and become chief city of the United States, the metropolis of America within five years, without New York annexes Brooklyn. No price is too great for New York to pay rather than lose its commercial prestige and standing as chief city of America; \$50,000,000 per year would be a small amount for New York to pay to save itself from such humiliation and loss of business. And when you consider that the total taxation of Brooklyn is only a little over \$12,000,000 annually, New York might far better pay it all and guarantee to us in Brooklyn exemption from all taxation of every kind for one hundred years to come rather than lose its prestige.

Imagine for one moment New York second to Chicago in everything it did, the sneers, taunts, gibes and insults that the New Yorkers now have to submit to from this Chicago would be multiplied a thousand-fold, and New York would be told of it, jeered at, twitted of it and taunted with it by Chicago every hour in the day, to say nothing of loss of business that always follows loss of prestige. New York lost the World's Fair, which is but a drop in the bucket compared to the loss which it will sustain if Chicago takes New York's place as chief city of America.

To show you how close Chicago is on to New York and what great benefit the World's Fair of 1893 has been to that city in matter of population, look at the total vote that Chicago polled for its Mayor at a special election on the 19th of last December (1893), when each side was cutting down the vote of the other side to the lowest possible degree, then compare it with New York's total vote of one month before. As there has been no general census of both cities since 1890 you will have to judge by their total vote, always considered a fair criterion. The following are the official figures, the New York vote being the one declared for Common Pleas Judge:

1893, New York total vote,	-	-	238,157
“ Chicago “ “ - - -	-	-	227,350
Difference only	-	-	10,807

At the same election Chicago registered 282,040 votes, or 16,193 more votes than New York did

NOTE.—This difference of only 10,807 between the total vote of New York and the total vote of Chicago, at the usual general average of one vote to every seven of population, indicates that this year, (1894), Chicago's population is only 75,649 behind New York.

There is but one avenue of escape for New York from the impending calamity that surely awaits it. And that avenue happily offers not temporary escape, but permanent for all time to come, as you will see by the table on page 30 of this pamphlet, viz., consolidation with Brooklyn.

Have you ever stopped to think what the loss of New York's position as chief city of America would amount to? What its effect on both New York and Brooklyn would be and *why* it would prove disastrous? No! Well, then let us for a moment examine into this matter, and to do this intelligently we must first understand why it is that being chief city of a nation is so very important to that city.

In every nation on the face of the earth is some one city which, being very much larger than any other city in that nation, is not only accorded by all other nations the fame and prestige of being chief city of that nation, but is looked up to all over the world as the leader, and its markets and prices quoted as the ruling markets and prices governing trade in that nation, hence the name Metropolis (Mother city.) In England it is London; in Germany it is Berlin; in France, Paris; in Holland, Amsterdam; and in the United States it is at the present time New York. This chieftainship over all other cities in a nation brings to that city all of the business of a metropolitan nature, which of a necessity must be located in the chief city of that nation, generally a wholesale banking business, or banking for other banks and trust companies of that nation, and the importing and exporting agencies of such foreign business houses of all kinds, as have but *one* agency or but one general agency in that particular nation, which agency must necessarily be located in the chief city of that nation. All of that class of strictly metropolitan business in this country is now located in New York, and it is the life, the main-stay and the support of New York. Following it and located near it are the thousand and one other and smaller concerns, which manufacture for or sell to the metropolitan trade and are dependent upon it, and, which being deprived of that trade by reason of its going to another city, either go with it or losing their chief support, struggle along for awhile, languish and fail. . . . It is a very low estimate to say that this class of metropolitan business with its following, is worth to the cities of New York and Brooklyn to-day not less than one thousand million dollars per annum. That New York's prestige as chief city, the metropolis of America, is now, for the first time, seriously threatened by Chicago, no one can safely deny. If New York should for any reason fail to consolidate with Brooklyn it would be the beginning of its downfall, for as it then will no longer be the metropolis of America, its metropolitan business must of a necessity go to the city that is. The change would not be sudden, but very gradual. Foreign banks and business houses, before taking their American banks and business houses away from New York, would wait until they were absolutely certain that New York was no longer chief city of America, then one by one those houses would,

"Fold their tents, like the Arabs, and as silently steal away."

The seats in its public exchanges would gradually become of less and less value, its great marts of trade would one by one close their doors, dry rot would set in and like "Great Cæsar, it falls," from its high estate

as the greatest of American cities and will then slowly sink into the oblivion of second and third place.

Take the case of New York and Philadelphia: Up to about the year 1803 Philadelphia was chief city, the metropolis of America, having all of the metropolitan trade above described.

It was admitted on all sides that Philadelphia was not only the greatest city of America, but that its situation and its great wealth were such that it necessarily would continue to be chief city, growing as the country grew, expanding as the nation expanded. It had not only the wealth, but the business, the manufactures, the trades, the brains, the society of this country. Its position was apparently so secure as to be impregnable. William Cullen Bryant's *History of the United States*, Vol. 4, page 91, says:

"At the close of the Revolutionary War, (1783), Philadelphia was chief city of this country, its population of forty thousand being double that of Boston, and three times that of New York. In a parade of Philadelphia tradesmen and mechanics fifty distinct trades were represented in the procession. It was built upon a solid foundation of manufactures and trade. New York was paralyzed from occupation of the British and from ravages of fire."

But New York began creeping up and passed Philadelphia some time about the year 1803. The primary cause of Philadelphia's loss of position was undoubtedly the determination of Congress to remove from Philadelphia, which it did, going to Washington some fifteen years later. But whatever the cause, the result is the same—New York got ahead and began to draw Philadelphia's metropolitan business away. It absorbed it more and more each year, as foreign banks and business houses became assured that New York's position as chief city of America was secure; until finally New York took it all, still has it, and will keep it for all time to come on one condition, viz., that it consolidates with Brooklyn, not otherwise, for it is self-evident that it cannot continue to have this metropolitan business and not be the metropolis. New York can't afford to voluntarily surrender its high position as chief city of America and meekly take second place, with the avenue of escape so close at hand; because, forsooth, it might cost a few pennies to avail itself of that avenue of escape,—consolidation with Brooklyn.

When New York ceases to be first city in the land it ceases to be of importance, it ceases to be New York. The loss of business that such calamity would entail on New York would simply be frightful.

Following that loss would of course come the great shrinkage in real estate values; thousands of workmen and rent-payers would be thrown out of employment, and they and their families compelled to move to cheaper quarters to save rent, if indeed they were able to pay any rent. Hundreds of stores and houses would in time become tenantless that never were so before. And then as New York real estate decreased in value, the tax rate upon it would of course be increased, in order to collect the same gross amount of taxes from it. So that whatever the cost to New York of consolidating Brooklyn with itself may be, IT WILL COST NEW YORK TEN TIMES AS MUCH IF IT DON'T DO IT. New York is not now in the position to dictate terms or quibble about price. Quite the contrary for its continued supremacy, it is wholly dependant upon annexation of Brooklyn.

If you will examine the statistics you will see that while the census shows that from 1880 to 1890, considering the aggregate population of New York, Kings County, and Long Island City; Chicago, notwithstanding its wild grab for population by annexation of far distant suburbs, gained nothing on the population of the Greater New York, but actually fell behind (see page 30 this pamphlet) over 200,000, and that, too, without allowing the consolidated city to annex any of the suburbs that now cluster around the Greater New York, such as the cities of Jersey City, Hoboken, Weehawken, Newark, Mt. Vernon, Yonkers, &c., all within 7 miles. New York, that is the New York on Manhattan Island, has reached the point where, owing to lack of rapid transit facilities, its growth as a city is not only greatly retarded, but at times almost at a standstill. The danger that Chicago will surpass New York is not only then greater than ever, but it is *absolutely certain to occur* in five years, and some say within three years, unless New York annexes Brooklyn. But with such annexation the consolidated city will have a population of over 3,000,000 to start with, and growing very much faster than Chicago, is not only placed forever out of the power of any other city to overtake it, but so extremely out of the power and so very far ahead of every other city that none will ever again make the effort to supersede the "Greater New York" as the Metropolis. It is then a case where New York and Brooklyn must apply to themselves the well known motto of the United States,

"UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL."

VII.

CHARACTER OF THE CITIES.

Brooklyn, unlike New York, is a city of small homes, the taxes on which are getting to be unbearable. New York on the other hand is an aggregation of giant corporations, huge buildings, and vast landed estates, the taxes on which are so low as not to be noticed. For every large building put up in Brooklyn, New York erects a dozen, each of the dozen generally worth five or six times what the Brooklyn one is; the New York building being also very quick to sell, while it is nearly impossible to sell the Brooklyn building even at cost price, asking no profit. It is said that twenty men and corporations pay one-half of New York taxes. Not so with Brooklyn: we have no Trinity Church Estate, no Sailor Snug Harbor Co., Rhineland or Astor Estates, Vanderbilt or New York Central properties, paying taxes on over one hundred million dollars each year and collecting those taxes back in their rents, largely from Brooklyn people. In Brooklyn it takes 20,000 people, each paying on \$5,000 worth of property to pay the taxes on \$100,000,000, which any one of a dozen great landed estates in New York are valued at, the two Astor estates alone being put down by experts as worth \$400,000,000. And, mark you! the State Board of Tax Assessors certify that those great estates are assessed for taxes at an average of only $44\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of their actual or selling value, and on that they are taxed, this year of 1894, only \$1.82 per \$100 of property taxed; while Brooklyn, a poor man's city, a city of small homes, is assessed at for taxes at 70 to 100 per cent. of its actual value, and on that taxed, this year of 1894, an average of $\$2.85\frac{1}{10}$ per \$100 of property taxed; thus making the Brooklyn property pay more than three times as much in taxes as the New York property per \$100 of its actual or selling value. New York also owning and controlling all of our ferries and water front franchises as shown in the other pamphlet.

Is it any wonder that the Brooklyn man complains? Is it not a greater wonder that there are not riots and bloodshed in the streets of both New York and Brooklyn as the result of such an outrageous state of affairs? Consolidate the two cities and equalize both the tax rates and tax valuations and you see for yourself that it will necessarily reduce Brooklyn taxes more than 50 per cent., while creating no perceptible increase in New York taxes. New York need not, therefore, fear that it is going to be loaded down with Brooklyn taxes; for while

New York can well afford to pay all of Brooklyn taxes rather than lose its prestige, yet we in Brooklyn don't ask it. The \$6,000,000 or thereabout reduction of Brooklyn taxes that consolidation will effect, will not be accompanied by a corresponding increase of New York taxes. Nothing of the kind! All that we ask is an equalization with New York. If, perchance, a slight increase in New York taxes should follow as the result of the consolidation, such increase at the most would be very slight and would not last over three years. Figures demonstrate this beyond question.

VIII.

BONDED INDEBTEDNESS.

By Article 8, Section 11, of the Constitution of the State of New York, amendment of 1884, the indebtedness of any city in this State, having a population over 100,000, is limited to ten per cent. of the assessed value of the real estate in that city, taxable personal estate not being considered. All indebtedness of any such city in excess of ten per centum of its taxable real estate, at the assessed valuation thereof made last previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, the Constitution says "shall be absolutely void," except revenue bonds issued in anticipation of the collection of taxes, and water bonds issued to procure a supply of water for such city, which are not included in the ten per cent. limit. Now then! By the annual message of the Mayors of New York and Brooklyn, sent to the respective Common Councils on January 1st, 1894, coupled with the last previous report of the tax department of the two cities, the following appears, viz.:

On January 1st, 1894, New York had taxable real estate at assessed valuations aggregating \$1,562,582,393, and a total outstanding indebtedness of \$100,762,407, leaving a margin between its total indebtedness and its constitutional limit of exactly \$55,495,832. And on the same day Brooklyn had taxable real estate at assessed valuations aggregating \$486,531,505, and a total outstanding indebtedness of \$47,337,499, leaving a margin of only \$1,315,651, before reaching its constitutional limit.

A very slight margin, you will say. Aye, so slender indeed, that clerks, teachers, policemen, firemen and other employees of Brooklyn are compelled to have their meagre salaries pared down and fifty dollars kept back from this man, one hundred from that man, and their families correspondingly deprived of necessities in order that the great

city of Brooklyn may make both ends meet and, if possible, avoid having its bonds rejected by banks and other owners as worthless for having exceeded the constitutional limit. Despite which, when the obligations that the city has assumed for the purchase of the Wallabout Market lands, the improvement of Liberty Street, etc., are considered, it is a very serious question whether the constitutional limit of Brooklyn indebtedness has not already been reached, with no margin whatever left.

If New York was assessed for taxes as high in proportion to the selling value of its property as Brooklyn, it would have a margin of over *two hundred million dollars* between its indebtedness and the constitutional limit. Mayor Gilroy of New York goes even farther than this. In an article published over his signature in the September, 1893, number of the "*North American Review*," Mayor Gilroy says:

"New York is probably the richest community on earth; there is no other city that can borrow money in the open market as cheaply as New York. It is because we are richer and our good faith unquestioned and unquestionable."

And in the October number of the same magazine, he inserts tables showing that New York City in addition to the taxable real estate within its limits, owns in its own right available assets of the value of five hundred and fifty-nine millions of dollars. And on page 410 of the same magazine he says:

"New York has ample real estate security to offer for a debt four times the size of the present obligations, or *four hundred million dollars*, if any extraordinary combination of circumstances should make it necessary to incur such a debt."

Following this up in the November, 1893, number of the "*North American Review*" Mayor Gilroy says:

"The closest estimate of the actual market value of such property as the New York tax commission have been able to find on which to lay taxes, is five thousand millions of dollars."

And, of course, the ten per cent. constitutional limit on the latter amount would be five hundred millions of dollars, or thirteen and one-half millions more than the total assessed real estate valuations of the entire city of Brooklyn. A thing almost incredible, viz., that the actual value of New York is so great that by simply increasing its assessed valuations on the tax books up to the actual value of the property taxed, as it has a perfect right to do, and is done in many instances in Brooklyn and other cities of this country, it could then legally incur an

indebtedness sufficient to buy every building, every vacant lot, every piece of real estate of every kind until there was in all Brooklyn, as it existed January 1st, 1894, not one inch left unpurchased—pay for it all at its full assessed valuation, and have thirteen and one-half million dollars left before exceeding New York's constitutional limit of indebtedness. And that even this does not include the \$559,000,000 of property that New York owns in its own right, capable of being made security for still further and stupendous sums of money: Yet here are the figures, examine them yourselves and be convinced that such *is* the case.

On page 543 of the same magazine, Mayor Gilroy in speaking of the New York tax department, further says:

“In a general way it is understood that the assessment made by the Tax Board is fixed, as nearly as may be, at 40 per cent. of the real or market value of the property taxed.”

As the Mayor of New York speaks officially for the city, it is not necessary to go behind his figures for further proofs.

In this pamphlet, as in the other, all figures and quotations given have been carefully compared with the official reports and originals referred to, so as to avoid any errors: It is possible that annexation of the county towns of Kings County to Brooklyn may bring in sufficient additional real estate to enable Brooklyn to issue a few more bonds and so stave off bankruptcy for a while longer; but not to any material extent, as those towns are loaded down with debts already.

So far as the present outstanding indebtedness of the two cities are concerned, Brooklyn does not ask New York to pay one penny of her former bonds. Each city will pay its own debts outstanding up to the time that consolidation takes effect. Like two men going into partnership with each other, neither one pays the former debts of the other. The probability is that the consolidated city will issue bonds covering the taxable property of both cities, and use them to take up and redeem the outstanding bonds of both cities in such proportions of each as will be equitable; say, for every one million dollars of Brooklyn's bonds and debts thus paid off, let two millions of New York's outstanding debts and bonds be paid, or whatever other amount the finance department of the two cities should find and certify to be the proper and exact proportion between the two cities. In that way Brooklyn can take up its outstanding bonds, paying $3\frac{1}{2}$ and 4 per cent. interest with bonds of the consolidated city issued at $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent. interest, the same rate that New

York now pays, with no possibility of running against the constitutional limit, for at the start there would be, as above shown, over \$55,000,000 margin under the constitutional limit of the consolidated city; with an extreme possible limit of four hundred to five hundred millions (\$500,000,000), as shown by Mayor Gilroy above quoted. The present figures also showing that New York side alone increases in value of its taxable property from one hundred to one hundred and forty million dollars per year, assessed for taxes as before stated at only 40 to 44½ cents on the dollar, and the constitutional limit, therefore, even at that low rate enlarges and increases each year from ten to fourteen millions (\$14,000,000.)

IX.

NEW BRIDGES AND IMPROVEMENTS.

The great expense of building the proposed new bridges over the East River is such, that private companies organized to build them cannot show probable dividends from bridge receipts sufficient to make it an object for stockholders to invest their money in building them—hence, no bridges: New York City does not want the bridges unless the cities are consolidated, and Brooklyn City is so close to the constitutional limit of its indebtedness, that it could not safely undertake to build a single bridge pier. But one course remains—consolidate the cities and let the bridges be built by the consolidated city and made passage free, the same as any other street or highway in the same city. And what is true of the new bridges, is also true of other much needed Brooklyn improvements; its rough cobble stone streets, its wretched sewers and miserable waterworks can only be improved by the outlay of vast sums of money, which it cannot get because the city has about reached its debt limit.

Inadequate fire department apparatus causes immense conflagrations, and no money can be had to buy first class machinery and modern appliances. No person will trust the city when there is great danger that the debt may be declared void.

As the situation is to-day, every time that the city issues a new lot of bonds for money to pay for absolute necessities, it must, like a servant girl looking for a situation, take its certificate of good character along, (from the courts,) so as to prove that the bonds are not void for having exceeded the ten per cent. debt limit. And if, perchance, buyers are

found without the city being sent back to the courts for a new certificate of good character, Brooklyn public officials clap their hands in high glee at the discovery that the city's credit is still good.

But when the cities are consolidated all this will be changed, when Brooklyn is part and parcel of the Greater New York, so that it has the unlimited New York credit described by Mayor Gilroy in the last chapter, more Brooklyn streets will be well paved and properly sewered in one year than will otherwise be done in ten years. And in five years time, the arches of at least three new bridges will be seen spanning the East River, which it is now evident will not be seen until then.

Are not the thousands of working men who will build those bridges, pave those streets, lay those sewers, and the countless other thousands of working men who will build the stores, houses and flats then made saleable and rentable along the lines of those bridges and streets, the persons most deeply interested in consolidation of the cities?

X.

WATER SUPPLY.

(A SUGGESTION.)

The scant supply of water in Brooklyn, each year growing less and less, not only threatens the city with loss of health and possible pestilence spreading to New York, but sooner or later with a terrible conflagration which may lay half the city in ashes from simple lack of water to put out the fire. The present supply is obtained by pumping from small lakes, creeks and ponds on Long Island into reservoirs leading to the city street mains and pipes. Any attempt to extend this pumping process is but a make-shift soon exhausted: Why? Because it is known that there is not fresh water enough on all Long Island to supply two million people; and the little lakes, ponds and creeks not yet engaged in supplying the Brooklyn Water Works are already depended on, and in many cases pre-empted by some one or more of the scores of villages and Long Island Towns scattered along their lines. You cannot rob those villages and towns of their water supply. What then can be done? Let us see! New York has just completed an aqueduct 31 miles long, which its engineers and the aqueduct commissioners in their report state cost, including all dams, approaches, feeders, &c., \$28,576,775.10, up to May 31st, 1894, and which they certify is alone capable of supplying 300,000,000 gallons of water per day; in addition to which the former Croton system still supplies 80,000,000 gallons per day and the Bronx River system 20,000,000

gallons, making a total of 400,000,000 per day, which allowing one hundred gallons per day to each inhabitant, man, woman, child or babe in arms, will supply four million people with all of the water that they can use; or one million more people than there are in both New York and Brooklyn.

By connecting the New York and Brooklyn water systems with pipes laid across the East River at several crossings, probably on the river bottom anchored and protected in the usual manner, an abundance of water can be immediately obtained. And while it is true that in very dry weather the present New York supply may not be sufficient to fill the aqueduct to its carrying capacity, yet in ordinary weather it is capable of temporarily supplying both New York and Brooklyn, while Brooklyn would still have its present system and pumping process, only calling on New York for deficiency or in case of accident.

To thus hitch the Brooklyn water supply system unto the New York system as one of the results of Consolidation of the cities, would give immediate relief to Brooklyn without endangering New York. Then, by uniting with that city in extending the aqueduct to the Housatonic River, Lake George or Champlain, an inexhaustible supply of pure water for both cities could be obtained, each side paying only its proper portion of the expense, and many millions of dollars be thus saved to the tax-payers of both cities.

XI.

PRIDE OF LIVING IN NEW YORK A FACTOR.

You may tell the New Yorker it is only his pride of living in New York that makes him pay \$200 per month for a stuffy flat an hour's ride uptown from City Hall, when he can get a brown-stone front on a nice street in Brooklyn, but a half hour's ride from the same City Hall, for \$75 per month, or buy it at the rate of \$100 per month; or, if he desires to save money, can get a smaller brick or stone-front house having all modern conveniences, and on a good street, for \$25 to \$30 a month rent, or buy it for \$4,000 or \$5,000. And in the outskirts of Brooklyn can buy a wooden house for even \$2,000 to \$3,500. He will probably deny your assertion; but that does not alter the fact, it is his pride. And in one sense it is a justifiable pride. All over the world, wherever it is known that such a country as America exists, there it is known also that America has one great city so situated with its neighboring city of Brooklyn, that by the simple process of the consolidation of the two,

will make it the greatest city in the world before another generation passes, and that that city is named New York. Every American takes a pride in the fact and calls it all New York. Three thousand miles away you will find Americans boasting of what our New York is and what is going to be. And this very fact, his pride that New York is known all over the world as the largest, the richest, the most powerful and influential city of America, holds the New Yorker a resident in that city when he knows that he can get better accommodations for one-quarter the money in Brooklyn. Pride is one of the strongest of all human motives, so strong indeed, that it has starved many a man and woman to death rather than make their wants known. What's the use of ignoring it? It's an element in the case,—bank on it and use it. I make the bold assertion that the pride of living in New York controls and fixes the price of every foot of residence property on Manhattan Island. If it were not so, Brooklyn residence property, easier of access and in as good a location, would be just as valuable as New York residence property; while we all know that it has not one-quarter the value of New York property, simply because it is not New York.

Pride of living in New York and in the best part of New York, caused a vacant lot on Fifth Avenue, 50×125 feet, to sell for \$540,000; while a lot of the same size in the best part of Brooklyn brought but \$18,400, and all of the talk and ridicule of the world does not affect it.

NOTE.—In May, 1891, a vacant lot 50×125 feet on Fifth Avenue, New York, S. E. corner of 55th Street, was sold by Mrs. Hammersly, known as the Duchess of Marlborough, to W. J. Astor, Jr. for \$540,000. The same week a lot the same size in best part of Brooklyn Heights sold for \$18,400. See Real Estate Record of that date. Since which time New York residence property has increased in value and Brooklyn residence property has decreased in value.

It was pride that made this great difference in the value of the two lots of land, for the Brooklyn Heights property is even more eligibly situated, nearer to business, easier of access, surrounded by just as good a class of residences as the New York lot and having no objectionable features near at hand. "Pride," in this particular case, upon a lot 50×125 feet was then of the exact marketable value of \$521,600—the fortune of a lifetime. To consolidate Brooklyn with New York under the name of New York, is to extend that pride to Brooklyn, and have it influence and enhance the value of Brooklyn property as well, and that without injury to New York. Here, again, is where the workingman and mechanic will be most benefited by consolidation of the cities: because with the increased values of Brooklyn property caused

by a greater demand for New York houses and lots in Brooklyn, will of course come a building boom to supply that demand. That building boom will necessitate the employment of thousands of mechanics. It can't be otherwise. Where now a dozen mechanics are employed in the building trades, then there will be a thousand, and where now a thousand are at work, then there will be twenty thousand. And this will benefit New York as well as Brooklyn, because it will increase the taxable property of the city.

If the New Yorker now has reason to be proud of New York as chief city of Amercia, he will then have greater reason to be proud of it as second city in size in the world, having certainty that in the near future it will be chief city of the world, as it is now of America. The equalization of values between New York and Brooklyn property will therefore not be by the shrinkage of New York values, but by the permanent rise in Brooklyn values. The owner of Brooklyn vacant property, in order to obtain benefit of his rise in values, must then either build upon it or sell out to some one who will; otherwise the more money the vacant property becomes worth, the more money the owner is losing every day by holding it idle. The \$540,000 vacant lot on Fifth Avenue, New York, is money lost to its owner unless he sets at work hundreds of mechanics and workingmen building a mansion upon it in keeping with the price of the lot and its surroundings. This rise in Brooklyn real estate, by reason of its becoming part of New York, will then of a necessity give employment for several years to countless thousands of poor people, mechanics and workmen who are not now employed, in building upon and improving Brooklyn property; otherwise the owners will never get any benefit of the rise in values, and it would soon cease to exist. With the completion of those new buildings the working people, rent-payers and others will be enabled to get better quarters, better homes at cheaper rents, in the new flats, tenements and houses built on vacant property now held down and kept idle by its present excessive taxation and by the fear of still more enormous future taxes. Reduce those taxes one-half by consolidation of the cities, with no need to fear excessive future taxation, and every foot of that property is immediately worth improving. The \$10 or \$20 per month rent which will now not pay the taxes on a property, will then not only pay the taxes but interest on the money invested also, and of course the owner can afford to improve it. If, as has often been stated, there is danger of too much building then being done in Brooklyn, it

would only make rents come down and the poor man, the mechanic, the laborer, and the building material man, having received their pay for the buildings, have no cause to worry. Turn this question which way you will, look at it on all sides and in every light, the fact becomes more and more apparent and undeniable that the class of people who will receive the greatest and most immediate benefit from consolidation of the cities are the *workingmen and workingwomen, the mechanics and laborers and rent-payers of both cities together, with the people who are dependent upon them.*

To the New Yorker, then, consolidation of the cities means the salvation of all that he holds dear, his pride in New York as greatest city of America, together with the salvation of all of the metropolitan trade and business now in New York because it is the metropolis, the loss of which would mean ruin to New York and excessive taxation of its real estate as before described. To the Brooklynite it means reduction of taxes from 50 per cent. upwards, whereby the terrible blight, the curse of Brooklyn's excessive taxation, will be forever removed. And to the workingmen, mechanics, laborers, building material men of both cities, together with those engaged in trading with and selling to them, it means a degree of prosperity and permanent employment that they have never before enjoyed.

Then let one and all, whether residing in New York or Brooklyn, on next election day make sure to vote the ballot which reads:

FOR CONSOLIDATION.

Respectfully yours,

EDWARD C. GRAVES,

234-235 Broadway,

New York.

BROOKLYN, July 2d, 1894.

(FOR TABLE REFERRED TO SEE NEXT PAGE.)

TABLE.

(Referred to on pages 16 and 19.)

Showing the comparative growth of the consolidated city of New York and of the city of Chicago, including all of the latter's annexations during the period of ten years, from 1880 to 1890, taken from census reports of those years.

Chicago population, 1890,	-	-	-	1,099,850
“ “ 1880,	-	-	-	503,185
Chicago gain in ten years,	-	-	-	596,665
Consolidated City of New York:				
New York population, 1890, (October census,)	-	-	-	1,710,715
Kings County “ “ “ “	-	-	-	892,058
Long Island City “ “ - - -	-	-	-	30,506
Total, 1890,	-	-	-	2,633,279
The same territory in 1880:				
New York population, 1880,	-	-	-	1,206,577
Kings County “ “ - - -	-	-	-	599,549
Long Island City “ “ - - -	-	-	-	17,096
Total, 1880, - - -	-	-	-	1,823,222
Deduct population of 1880 from that of 1890 shows that consolidated New York without annexations gains in ten years,	-	-	-	810,057
Deduct from it Chicago's gain in ten years, including all annexations,	-	-	-	596,665
Chicago in 10 years falls behind, - -	-	-	-	213,392

NOTE.—To the total population of Chicago in 1890 must now be added, not only its natural growth since then, but the immense influx of population caused by the World's Fair of 1893, as indicated by the vote given on page 16 of this pamphlet. It will therefore be seen that while Chicago has gained and is gaining tremendously on New York alone, yet notwithstanding its annexation of far distant suburbs, its boom received from the World's Fair, it falls greatly behind the increase of Greater New York population in the same years. If we then add to the population of New York, Kings County and Long Island City, their natural growth since 1890, in the same ratio shown by the census of 1890 over that of 1880, it gives the consolidated city in the year 1895 a population of 3,038,307, not counting other territory likely to be annexed. Therefore the consolidation of cities into the Greater New York not only saves New York its prestige and metropolitan business, but secures it for all time to come: And the persons who will be the most benefited are the working classes and rent-payers.

TESTIMONIALS.

The following testimonials selected from several hundred are printed for the purpose of showing that the proposed reduction of Brooklyn taxes by equalizing them with New York taxes in a consolidated city, having been the means of overcoming Brooklyn opposition to consolidation, described on pages 5 to 9 of this pamphlet, the Brooklyn voter may therefore safely take it for granted that a vote for consolidation means for consolidation of New York and Brooklyn into one city, having an equal and uniform rate of taxation.

For Brooklyn to vote against consolidation, would put an end to all possibility of obtaining reduction of Brooklyn taxes by equalizing them with New York's in one city: And for New York to vote against consolidation would be suicidal, for the reasons given on pages 15 to 20 of this pamphlet.

Hon. Andrew H. Green, President of the Consolidation Commission, in a speech before the Brooklyn Real Estate Exchange, said:

"That your taxes are disproportionately large and that they can be reduced is clearly shown by the able pamphlet of Edward C. Graves, Esq., who has kindly volunteered to aid the Commission by a thorough investigation of this subject of taxation in Brooklyn."

What Judge Wm. J. Gaynor says:

Supreme Court Chambers,
BROOKLYN, April 5th, 1894.

MY DEAR MR. GRAVES:

I understand that you are going to get up a second pamphlet. I know of no one so competent to get out a pamphlet on consolidation, and especially on that phrase of the question which involves the comparative taxation of New York and Brooklyn, as yourself.

You were the first one to direct attention thereto in connection with the question of consolidation. *There will not be many in Brooklyn in favor of consolidation for any mere sentimental or fanciful reasons.*

Yours very truly,

W. J. GAYNOR.

To Edward C. Graves, Esq.

From the President of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank of New York, Treasurer of the Consolidation League of Brooklyn:

EDWARD C. GRAVES, ESQ.:

Dear Sir: During a thirty-five year residence in Brooklyn, I have always believed in ultimate union of these two cities. But the consolidation movement has needed leaders to agitate the question. In your first pamphlet you show the practicability of this movement and the great benefit that will flow to the tax-payers and rent-payers from such union, and that the time has arrived when this union should take place.

This is admitted on all sides. I have just read your second pamphlet. I consider your treatment of the subject most admirable. I had believed myself thoroughly well informed on the merits of the consolidation of these two great cities, New York and Brooklyn, and thought that I had thoroughly weighed, analyzed and duly considered the advantages that would accrue to each, but you have thrown so much new light on the subject that I am amazed.

Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,
May 8th, 1894.

I am, very truly yours,
JAMES MCMAHON.

From President of Sprague National Bank:

EDWARD C. GRAVES, ESQ.:

BROOKLYN, April 16th, 1894.

Dear Sir: Rumors have reached me that you intend writing a second pamphlet on the advantages to be derived from consolidation of the cities of New York and Brooklyn.

I want to say that your first pamphlet was a grand success. It caused every reader to stop and reason with himself upon the benefits of such annexation with *equal taxation as a basis*. I am pleased to find that almost without exception the masses believe it is for the benefit of each city, and should receive practically unanimous consent of the voters of both cities.

Yours sincerely,

N. T. SPRAGUE.

From Chairman Executive Committee, Consolidation League:

EDWARD C. GRAVES.

Dear Sir:—Your first pamphlet "How to reduce Brooklyn taxes one-half by consolidation of the cities," was a complete discussion of the matter as it then stood. In the discussion of the past two years it has been the general text-book and encyclopedia. It was especially valuable because in it you were the first to intelligently develop the facts about Brooklyn taxation, and to show their relation to consolidation, or more exactly that consolidation is the only remedy for Brooklyn's tax difficulties.

Yours very truly,

EDWARD M. GROUT.

From the rubber manufacturing firm of Parker, Stearns & Sutton.

EDWARD C. GRAVES.

Dear Sir:—I desire to say that I have lived in Brooklyn about forty years, and until you brought out and developed the Brooklyn tax and water front questions, and in your famous pamphlet "An Appeal to Reason or How Taxes in Brooklyn can be reduced one-half," showed and *proved* that the only possible cure for Brooklyn's constantly increasing tax-rate is consolidation of the cities, there never was any consolidation sentiment in Brooklyn worth mentioning.

That pamphlet is doing the business. The fact that up to January 1st, 1894, sixty thousand copies have been distributed in Brooklyn from hand to hand without any advertising, and that so far as appearances show those copies were not destroyed, but were carefully read, then put away by the reader for future reference, and that not a single opponent of consolidation has been able to contradict one line of it, tells the story. Awaiting the publication of your second pamphlet with anticipation of great pleasure in reading it, I am, dear Sir,

Very truly yours,

RUSSELL PARKER.

From the Secretary of the Brooklyn Real Estate Exchange:

EDWARD C. GRAVES, ESQ.

Dear Sir:—I desire to express to you my appreciation of your efforts to educate the people of Brooklyn to a proper understanding of the advantages to be gained by consolidation. The facts as presented in your first pamphlet have carried conviction to hundreds and thousands of our people, and as a reference book it has proved almost invaluable.

Yours truly,

GEORGE W. CHAUNCEY.

From the Secretary of the Brooklyn Consolidation League.

EDWARD C. GRAVES, ESQ.,

Dear Sir:—On the first day for payment of the Brooklyn taxes for year 1894, I placed two men on the steps in front of the tax-collectors office, and as each tax-payer, man or woman, walked up to pay his or her taxes, then found to be higher than ever before, he or she was handed a copy of your now famous pamphlet "How taxes in Brooklyn can be reduced one-half by consolidation of the cities." In that way I placed in the hands of tax-payers only, in one week, from December 1st to December 8th, 1893, 11,500 copies of your pamphlet. No person was permitted to have more than one copy. The effect of this was truly marvelous. At one time I saw more than one hundred people standing around the City Hall Square reading your document. I watched carefully and so far as I could see or learn not a single copy was thrown away or wasted. On the contrary, the people demanded them and struggled to get them. And from the determined look on each face and casual remarks made by the people, one could see that it was good seed well sown.

It was most interesting, indeed, to stand one side and witness the slow formation of that mighty power, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

Your successful solution of the Brooklyn tax question is certainly the key to the consolidation movement, overcoming Brooklyn opposition and slowly but surely uniting the cities.

Very truly yours,

SANDERS SHANKS, Sec'y C. L.

A highly interesting and instructive pamphlet.—*N. Y. World.*

Thirty thousand copies of Edward C. Graves' consolidation pamphlet: "How taxes in Brooklyn can be reduced one-half" were distributed by the Consolidation League in Brooklyn during the fall campaign of 1893, and greatly aided in the result.—*N. Y. Recorder.*

We print on another page several columns of extracts from Edward C. Graves' consolidation pamphlet: "An Appeal to Reason, or How to reduce Brooklyn taxes one-half." Mr. Graves begins at the other end as it were, and limits his observations to the single point: "How to reduce Brooklyn taxes." Ask any person what he thinks of such possibility and practically the entire body of citizens would reply with Artemus Ward: "it would be a sweet boon." Its style is clear, straight-forward and simple, that of a man who knows thoroughly his subject and believes what he knows. There are no theories or speculations in Mr. Graves' paper; the facts, nothing but the facts are there, and they must be met if met at all by material of the same sort.—*Brooklyn Standard Union.*



